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The recent growth of defense expenditures has once more raised 
public concern about cost overruns on defense contracts. Economists 
have pointed out that cost overruns are not necessarily bad Qfil:: se; 
instead, attention should be directed to the question as to whether 
the procurement policies of the Department of Defense (DoD) satisfy 
the criterion of economic efficiency (see Peck and Scherer (1962)). 
In connection with this, applications of the principal-agent model to 
defense contracting show that not only do cost plus fixed fee (CPFF) 
contracts create moral hazard problems, but that in fact so long as 
contractors are risk averse and perfect monitoring of their activities 
is not possible, inefficiencies will arise whatever the form of the 
contract employed in DoD procurement (see Ross (1973), Harris and 
Raviv (1979), and Weitzman (1980)). It has been suggested that 
improvements in efficiency might be achieved if contracts more closely 
resembling Arrow-Debreu contingent claims were employed (see Cummins 
(1977)), but this raises problems of manipulation of the probabilities 
of occurrence of the relevant states of the world. Lookine; at the 
*This research was support.ed in part under funding by the Department 
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the authors, 
problem of cost escalation from a completely different point of view, 
biases might be introduced into cost comparisons and into decision 
making with respect to risky projects simply because of the 
methodology employed by cost estimators (see Quirk and Terasawa 
(1983)). 
In this paper, we examine one further source of cost 
escalation and inefficiency in defense contracting namely, 
"turbulence. " By turbulence is meant fluctuations over time in 
product specifications, in delivery schedules, in order quantities, 
and in other aspects of procurement. In the present paper, we 
restrict our attention to turbulence with respect to order quantities, 
but the approach we use can be extended to other forms of turbulence 
as well. Turbulence in order quantities is introduced into defense 
contracting because most DoD contracts (the so called "annual" 
contracts) provide only for tentative time paths of purchases by DoD, 
time paths that can be changed unilateraly by DoD. Turbulence in 
order quantities occurs as a result of the Congressional budgeting 
process, DoD decision making, the cost history of a weapon system, and 
a myriad of other factors, both random and nonrandom. A portion at 
least of the turbulence that is observed represents simply a rational 
response on the part of DoD to new information as it becomes 
available--a change in the nature of external threats as perceived by 
DoD, or developments or lack of developments in competing and 
complementary weapon systems, for example. Uncertainties introduced 
into the procurement process by the availability of new information 
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may be an inherent part of the acquisition process. If so, this kind 
of uncertainty is the price for flexibility and there is no ground for 
arguing that it should be removed from the procurement process by 
means of guarantees or legislative action. On the other hand, if the 
turbulence observed in order quantities is due to poor planning or the 
lack of coordination between DoD and the contractor, reduction of such 
uncertainties would be a desirable endeavor in a move toward an 
efficient allocation of resources. 
In any case, it is generally believed in DoD that turbulence 
is a major source of cost escalation in weapon systems, and that 
reforms in the budgeting process that would permit long term 
commitments by DoD to definite time paths of procurement levels, could 
substantially decrease the cost of defense procurement. One way in 
which reducing turbulence might produce savings is through the 
adoption of more capital intensive production processes by defense 
contractors, who are known to be characterized by low capital 
intensity coefficients, presumably in part because of the uncertainty 
as to the time path of orders under defense contracts. 
Documentation as to the effect of turbulence on procurement 
costs is difficult to obtain, because the accounting system used by 
DoD to identify the causes of cost growth in a weapon syste1n provides 
little in the way of useful information on this score. In the next 
section, we illustrate the kinds of changes that occur in DoD 
procurement schedules by looking at the case of one recently developed 
weapon system. In addition, we summarize some empirical evidence for 
the low capital/output ratios of defense contractors. 
We then examine the effect of turbulence on the behavior of 
defense contractors in the setting of a simplified two period model. 
If a contractor is risk neutral, then under any of the usual DoD 
contracting approaches except CPFF, an increase in turbulence results 
in an increase in expected cost of production for the contractor, 
assuming a convex cost function. Increases in turbulence have a less 
predictable effect on the amount of capital used in production. In 
the case of a CES production function, less capital is employed if 
capital and labor are close substitutes for one another, under 
constant or increasing returns to scale. But this conclusion is 
reversed when capital and labor are poor substitutes for one another, 
under constant or decreasing returns. 
The appropriate measure of "cost" in the risk averse case is 
the lump sum payment required by the contractor to restore him to the 
level of expected utility enjoyed before turbul.ence was increased. 
This sum is always positive for risk neutral or risk averse 
contractors, given a convex cost function, under any of the usual DoD 
contracting arrangements other than CPFF. Moreover, considering the 
terms arrived at in the contract to be the result of a bargaining game 
between DoD and the contractor, DoD will share some of the increased 
costs due to turbulence except in the case where all the gains from 
trade are captured by the contractor. While a high degree of 
substitutability between capital and labor provides an explanation for 
a capital intensity bias in the risk neutral case, more complicated 
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conditions would be required to extend this result in the risk averse 
case. Consequently an alternative explanation is explored. What is 
argued here is that the renegotiation process employed by DoD might 
offer an explanation for a capital intensity bias. If it is assumed 
that contracts get renegotiated when the contractor would suffer out 
of pocket losses (revenue does not cover variable costs), then this 
form of renegotiation induces a capital intensity bias--defense 
contractors use less capital than they would under the same 
circumstances (but without renegotiation) in nondefense work. 
Renegotiation might also result in a preference by contractors for 
more rather than less turbulence, depending upon whether they are over 
or under compensated for turbulence through renegotiation. 
Turbulence: An Example 
Turbulence in the time path of order quantities is present in 
most defense contracting. Here we present data on a major weapon 
system, the UH-60A (Black Hawk) helicopter, based on an excellent 
recent study by Gates [1983]. The UH-60A is the first new helicopter 
to be developed by the Army since the 1960s. Its operational mission 
is that of expanding on the role of the UH-1 Huey helicopter, with 
added lifting capacity, speed, maneuverability and range. 
The Black Hawk is currently in production and has been a 
technical success, meeting or exceeding all of the operational 
requirements set forth in the initial performance specifications. 
Moreover, development of the Black Hawk came within four months of 
meeting schedule deadlines set six and one half years earlier. The 
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original schedule provided for initial operational capability to occur 
in July, 197 7 .  (Initial operational capability was defined a s  one 
company equipped with 15 Black Hawk helicopters, complete with 
training and all support equipment on line). Actual initial 
operational capability was achieved in November, 197 7 .  
However, the procurement schedule for the Blackhawk has been 
revised several times over the course of its development history. The 
total number of units to be produced has remained constant in all of 
these revisions, but the schedule has been stretched out and the time 
path of order quantities varied. Table 1 provides a summary of these 
changes. 
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TABLE  1 
BLACK HAHK PROCUREMENT SCHEDU L E  
Fiscal Year 








1977 15 15 15 15 15 15 
197 8 24 56 56 56 56 56 
197 9 46 129 129 92 92 92 
1980 121 16 8 145 94 94 94 
1981 16 8 168 145 80 80 80 
1982 168 168 145 96 96 96 
1983 168 180 145 75 96 96 
1984 180 180 145 29 84 84 
1985 180 43 145 31 63 78 
1986 37 37 65 54 78 
1987 96 70 78 
1988 96 54 85 
1989 96 96 96 
1990 96 96 79 
1991 90 61 
Totals 1, 107 1,107 1,107 1, 107 1, 107 1,107 
(The original (1971) procurement schedule provided for a delivery of 
276 aircraft over the initial three year period. This was revised 
down to 85 before the October 1976 Baseline Cost Estimate was 
prepared). 
Source: Gates [1983]. 
During the course of development of the Black Hawk, cost 
estimates have been prepared on a more or less regular basis, 
reflecting both supply side factors such as delays, inflation and the 
like, and the effect of turbulence and other demand side factors. The 
cost history of the Black Hawk has shown a pronounced escalation over 
time. Table 2 summarizes cost estimates for the projected 1,107 
helicopters over the period 1971-1982. 
TABLE  2 
BLACK HAWK COST ESTIMATES, CURRENT DOLLARS, 1971-1982 
Date 
December 31, 1971 
December 31, 1973 
June 30, 1974 
September 30, 1974 
March 31, 1975 
June 30, 1975 
December 31, 1979 
December 31, 1980 
March 31, 1981 
September 30, 1981 
September 30, 1982 
Source: Gates [1983]. 
Cost Estimate 
(millions of $) 
$1, 897. 4 
2, 249. 6 
2, 955. 8 
3, 520.2  
3, 157. 5 
2, 864.0 
5,242. 7  
6, 099. 6 
6, 812. 6 
7 , 262.7 
7, 230. 8 
Gates' study does not attempt to estimate the quantitative 
impact of turbulence on cost or cost estimates. In fact, the 
information system used by DoD in identifying sources of cost growth 
(primarily the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR)) is not structured so 
as to provide data to answer such questions. The Gates study simply 
identifies turbulence as one of several factors contributing to cost 
growth for the Blacl( Hawk, while recognizing the "chicken and egg" 
nature of the links between turbulence and costs. Thus an increase in 
cost can lead to a stretch out of orders (turbulence) because of 
budgetary constraints on DoD, just as a change in order quantities can 
induce growth in cost due to the need to cancel or accelerate input 
orders, revise delivery dates for components, provide for overtime or 
for layoffs, and the like. 
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Capital Intensity Bias in Defense Contracting 
The empirical evidence for a capital intensity bias in defense 
contracting comes from several studies, beginning with one by 
Weidenbaum (1967) , Weidenbaum selected a small sample of firms 
engaged in defense contracting, and compared data on these firms with 
data from a small sample of non-defense firms, using the periods 
1952-55 and 1962-65, The defense firms showed a lower profit margin 
on sales (roughly 2, 8% vs, 4. 5% for the non-defense firms), and a 
higher rate of return on net worth (18% vs. 12% for the non-defense 
firms). The reason for this discrepancy between return on sales and 
return on net worth is that the "capital turnover" ratio of defense 
firms was sir;nificantly higher than that for non-defense firms (6. 5  
vs. 2. 6), Capital turnover is the ratio of sales to net worth, 
Weidenbaum argues that the higher capital turnover ratio of defense 
firms reflects the large amounts of government supplied capital that 
defense firms use, this capital not being accounted for in net worth, 
Weidenbaum does not explain why it is that defense firms rely on 
government supplied capital rather than investing in capital on their 
own. 
Belden (1969) divided the Fortune 500 into three groups, based 
on the fraction of total sales represented by DoD and NASA sales for 
each firm over the period 1957-1967, Belden finds that the average 
capital turnover ratios for firms with zero or low DoD and NASA sales 
ratio was low (around 2. 75) as compared to the capital turnover ratios 
for firms for which DoD and NASA sales represent more than 50% of 
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total sales (average capital turnover ratio of 5. 80), 
A GAO [1969] study involved a survey of 74 large defense 
contractors to determine financial data broken down by type of 
business, The GAO study found that the average capital turnover ratio 
on DoD business was 4.9 as compared to a turnover ratio of 2.3 on 
commercial business, 
Pegram [ 1983] looks instead at the value of property, plant 
and equipment (PP6.E) per employee, Using a sample of four large 
defense contractors and a sample of 6 non-defense firms, data ver the 
1977-1982 period show that PP�E per employee for the defense 
contractors is $11, 716 while the figure for non-defense contractors is 
$16, 157. Thus all of these studies show a capital intensity bias for 
defense contractors as compared to non-defense firms, 
The Theory--The Risk Neutral Case 
Turning next to the theory, consider the following simplified 
model. A defense contractor is engaged in the production of a weapon 
system, under a DoD contract, This is a two-period model. At time 1, 
the quantity ordered for the first period, q1, is known with 
certainty, but q2, the second period order quantity, is a random 
variable with probability density function f(q2), The production
function for the contractor is time independent, being given by 
t 1, 2 (1) 
Capital K is a fixed input; K is chosen at time 1 and is fixed 
thereafter. Labor Lt is a variable input. In particular, L2 is 
chosen only after the order quantity q2 is known. Production must
meet order quantities, 
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We are interested in determining the effects of turbulence on 
cost and on the capital intensity of the production process chosen by 
the contractor. In this section we examine the case of a risk neutral 
contractor; in the succeeding sections we look at the case of a risk 
averse contractor. 
Let C(q1, q2, K) denote the discounted cost of production to the
contractor for order quantities q1, q2, and a choice of capital K.
Then C(') is given by 
(2) 
where P is the price per unit of capital, w is the wage rate, o is a 
discount factor, and L1, L2 satisfy 
We assume that gL > 0, gK 0, gLL < O, gLK > O. Under these 
assumptions, it follows that C is monotone increasing and strictly 
convex in q2 for any given K, since G = ow/gL > 0, q2 
Consider next the expected value of cost under the pdf f, EfC: 
( 4) 
Suppose that f is replaced by the pdf h(q2) where h represents 
a mean preserving increase in the spread of f, We will interpret the 
change from f to h to be an increase in "turbulence. " Then 
Proposition 1 follows: 
Proposition 1 An increase in turbulence results in an increase in 
min EC; that is, if h is a mean preserving increase in the spread of 
K 
f, then min EhC > min EfC' K K 
Proof: Following Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), if h is a mean 
preserving increase in the spread of f, then f stochastically 
dominates h in the sense of second degree stochastic dominance (see 
Hadar and Russell (1968)). That is 
q q 
f02 F(t) dt i J02 H(t) dt 
for all q2 2. 0, with strict inequality for some q2• When f 
stochastically dominates h in the sense of second degree ,•ochastic 
dominance, then Ef0(q2) < Eh0(q2) for all strictly convex functions
0(q2).
Since C( · ) is strictly convex in q2 for any given K, it 
* 
follows that min EfC < min EhC. K K 
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Proposition 1 asserts that if K is chosen to minimize expected 
cost, then an increase in turbulence increases expected cost. Does an 
increase in turbulence also have a predictable effect on the capital 
intensity of production, under a cost minimizing strategy? Proposition 
2 indicates that this depends on the third derivative of the 
*See the appendix foran-alterna ti ve proof of this proposition.
production function: 
Proposition 2 If K is c)1osen to minimize expected cost, then an 
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increase in turbulence results in a decrease (increase) in K if CK is 
strictly convex (strictly concave) in q2, for every K. 
Proof: This is another application of Rothschild and Stiglitz' 
result. If f stochastically dominates h in the sense of second degree 
stochastic dominance, then 
if CK is strictly convex in q2 for any K. Let Kf be the cost 
minimizing choice of K under f, and let Kh be the cost minimizing 
follows that Eh(CK(q2, Kf)) > O, so that Kh < Kf. If CK is strictly 
concave in q2 for any given K, then Kh > Kf. 
The condition that CK be convex in q2 is clearly highly 
restrictive. For example, if the production function g is of the CES 
variety, then CK is convex in q2 if the elasticity of substitution
coefficient is greater than 2, and if there are constant or increasing 
returns to scale. If the elasticity of substitution coefficient is 
less than 1, then under constant or decreasing returns to scale, CK is
concave. (See the appendix for details). 
In the case of the CES function, an increase in turbulence 
leads to less capital being used when capital and labor are relatively 
good substitutes for one another (and the scale parameter is 
sufficiently large), and to more capital being used when the inputs 
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are poor substitutes (and the scale parameter is sufficiently small). 
Just what the interpretation is in the general case is somewhat 
problematical. 
Thus far, we have looked at the way in which expected cost and 
capital intensity respond to turbulence under an expected cost 
minimizing strategy. Consider next the choices of defense contractors 
acting to maximize expected profits. Contractors are employed by DoD 
under one of four kinds of contracts: fixed price (FP), cost plus a 
fixed fee (CPFF), cost plus incentive fee (CPIF), or a modified fixed 
price contract. (MFP). We examine the effects of turbulence on 
expected cost and capital intensity treating the contractual 
arrangement as given. Later we look at the role of contract 
renegotiation in the decision making of contractors. 
Let R(q1, q2, Kl denote the discounted revenue function for the
contractor. Then R( • ) varies by contract type as follows: 
Fixed Price contract: 
• 
R( • ) = pq1 + &pq2, for some constant p; 
Cost Plus Fixed Fee contract: 
R( · ) = C(q1, q2, K) + A, for some constant A; 
Cost Plus Incentive Fee contract: 
R( • ) = aC(q1, q2, K) + p•q1 + &p•q2, for some constants
p' , a, 0 < a < 1;
Modified Fixed Price contract: 
*Strictly speaking-:-fixed price contracts can be divided into fixed 
price with redetermination (of the price) at some future date, and 
firm fixed price contracts. See Morse (1962). 
R( ' ) = p11q1 + &p
11q2 
+ bPK for some constants p'' ,b,O < b < 1. 
Given a risk neutral contractor, and given one of the above 
types of contracts, the contractor chooses K to maximize expected 
profits En , where 
Then the following proposition holds: 
Proposition 3 Given a risk neutral contractor, the effects of an 
increase in turbulence are the following: 
(1) Fixed Price: expected cost increases, capital intensity 
decreases (increases) if CK is convex (concave) in q2; 
(2) Cost Plus a Fixed Fee: effects on EC and K are indeterminate; 
(3) Cost Plus Incentive Fee: effects are as with fixed price; 
(4) Modified Fixed Price: effects are as with fixed price. 
Proof: 
(1) Under a fixed price contract, K is chosen to maximize 
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( 5) 
En = ER - EC. Since ER = pq1 + pq2 is independent of K, this means K 
is chosen to minimize EC. Hence the conclusions of Propositions 1 and 
2 apply. 
(2) Under a CPFF contract, En = A , where A is a constant 
independent of K. Thus the choice of K and the resulting EC are 
indeterminate for any pdf, 
( 3) Under a CPIF contract, 
En (1 - a)EC, O < a < 1. Clearly the argument of
(1) applies. 
( 4) Under an MFP contract, En = p' •q1 + &p' 'Eq2 - EC + bPK,
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where -EC+ bPK = - (1 - b)PK - wL1 - &wEL2 • Because (1 b)P is the
implicit price of K, EC is not minimized. However, changes h EC and 
in K because of turbulence are those predicted in Propositions 1 and 
2, since the EC bPK function is an EC function with (1 - b)P the 
price of capital. 
Thus, except for the CPFF case, an increase in turbulence 
produces an increase in expected cost given risk neutral contractors, 
while the effect on capital intensity is more speculative, depending 
on relatively obscure aspects of the production function. 
Consider next the case of a risk averse contractor. Let U(n) 
denote the monotone increasing strictly concave utility function for 
the contractor. Given a revenue function R( • ) associated with one 




R(q1) - PK - wL1 
R(q2) - wL2• 
The effect of turbulence on capital intensity bias is 
(6) 
ambiguous in the risk averse case, By the arguments given earlier, K 
decreases (increases) as turbulence increases, if UK is a convex
(concave) function of q2. 
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( 6) 
When rr is positive, then an increase in turbulence Kq2q2 
decreases the capital intensity of production in the risk neutral 
case, under FP, CPIF, or MFP contracting. When there is risk 
aversion, then even assuming constant or decreasing absolute risk 
aversion (which implies U' '' > 0) together with rrK positive does q2q2 
not remove the indeterminacy since rr is of unknown sign. It is q2 
clear that conditions guaranteeing convexity or concavity of UK will 
be obscure in terms of economic content. 
Thus we have the following. 
Proposition 4 
Given a risk averse contractor, an increase in turbulence has 
indeterminate effects on the choice of K, for all DoD contract types. 
The direction of change in this variable, as well as the quantitative 
magnitude of the change, will depend in general on the functional 
forms of the utility and production functions, as well as on the pdf. 
Consider next the effect of turbulence on cost. In a world of 
risk neutral contractors, the cost of turbulence to the contractor is 
reflected in the EC measure, since it is only expected profits that 
are of concern to contractors. In a world of risk averse contractors, 
the appropriate notion of the cost of turbulence to the contractor is 
the lump sum payment that would be required to restore the 
contractor's expected utility level to that he achieved before 
turbulence was introduced into the picture, Is such a lump sum 
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payment always positive? The answer again follows from the Rothschild 
and Stiglitz result. 
Proposition 5 An increase in turbulence increases cost to the 
contractor, in the sense that there is a decrease in the expected 
utility of any contractor experiencing turbulence. This holds under 
risk neutrality or risk aversion, given FP, CPIF, or l1FP contracts. 
Proof: Given a monotone increasing concave utility function U{rr) and 
given that rr2 is a strictly concave function of q2, thes� conditions
holding for all K, then for h a mean preserving increase in \,;.'l spread 
of f we have 
max Vh K 
from second degree stochastic dominance. Thus the cost to the 
contractor increases with turbulence given risk averse or risk neutral 
contractors. In the risk neutral case, the cost to the contractor 
reduces to EC. 
The fact that cost to the contractor increases with an 
increase in turbulence is not simply an abstract theoretical notion 
from the point of view of DoD. The contract terms arrived at in 
negotiations between DoD and a given contractor represent the solution 
to a bargaining game between a monopsonist and (often) a monopolistic 
contractor. Just how the gains from trade will be shared between 
these two parties depends on threat points and like notions of 
bargaining strength. Given a solution to such a bargaining game, then 
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when turbulence is introduced into the picture, the contractor suffers 
a loss as indicated in Proposition 5. Turbulence reduces the 
desirability of DoD contracts to contractors, which should have the 
effect of shifting bargaining strength away from DoD and to 
contractors. In the extreme case where DoD has all the bargaining 
power and contractors are indifferent between undertaking a contract 
or leaving the defense industry, the introduction of turbulence 
imposes all of its costs on DoD. In the other extreme case, where DoD 
is indifferent between signing a contract or going without the item, 
the costs of turbulence will be borne by the contractor. In the 
intermediate cases, both DoD and contractors presumably share the 
costs of turbulence, either under current contracts or under contracts 
to be negotiated in the future. Since turbulence is costly for 
contractors under all DoD contracts (except possibly CPFF), the 
following corollary to Proposition 5 is immediate. 
Corollary Turbulence increases DoD costs under FP, CPIF, or MFP 
contracts, unless DoD is on the margin of indifference between 
executing or not executing a contract. 
Calculation of the lump sum payment representing the cost to 
the contractor of an increase in turbulence can be made as follows. 
Let a denote a parameter that shifts the pdf f in such a way as to 
produce a mean preserving increase in spread, As above, let 
Then we have 
dV = {av aK + av}da + U'(rr1)dR1, aK aa aa 
av By the first order condition, aK = O. dR1 is the 
lump sum payment required to offset the change da, hence dV = 0 in 
solving for dR1 to obtain 
Integrating by parts twice we have 
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dR1 = -�(& )<J� {[U"(rr2)n + U'(n2)(n )
2
1 J�2(dF�t,a» dt}dq2)da nl q2q2 q2 a 
from which it follows that dR1 > 0, given that the change in a induces 
a change in f that satisfies second degree stochastic dominance. 
Given a change from, say, a0 to a1, the payment AR1 required 
to restore the level of expected utility is given by 
(7) 
Renegotiation of DoD Contracts 
One common method of compensating contractors for the loss in 
expected utility they suffer due to turbulence is through 
renegotiation of an existing contract, as in annual contracting. In 
the case of fixed price contracts this can come about through a 
redetermination of the price to be paid, after order quantities are 
determined. There are legal precedents indicating that when 
turbulence is DoD induced, DoD might be held responsible for any 
resulting losses, under CPFF as well as other contracting 
arrangements. 
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The most comprehensive study of contracting arrangements of 
DoD relevant to the renegotiation issue is the RAND study by Morse 
(1962), Turbulence was a major factor in renegotiations in the post 
World War II period, One classic case that went through the 
renegotiation process involved Boeing Aircraft, accused of earning 
excess profits by the Renegotiation Board in 1952 in connection with 
its development of the B-47. The case was finally settled in 1962, in 
a decision in which turbulence played a critical role, At one point 
the court said the following: 
"Throughout its existence, petitioner has never experienced 
normal business as that term is generally understood • . • •  In fact, 
whether petitioner was working to capacity or completely idle has been 
almost entirely governed by the exigencies of international politics 
and the safety or danger to the United States engendered thereby. Its 
business has always been characterized by peaks and valleys and 
abnormality rather than normalcy." (Morse, p, 131) • 
Morse's interpretation of the court's decision in favor of the 
company was this: "In the court's view the company is the victim of 
rapid shifts in demand and should not be blamed for inefficiencies in 
the use of plant or equipment that arise on that score. No 
distinction is drawn between the variability in demand that is common 
to most commerce and that which is peculiar to the weapons industry. 
The implication is that the government must be held almost wholly 
responsible for such variability. " (Morse, p. 132). 
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In his study of the use of fixed price contracts, Morse found 
that in 1960, 31% of the fixed price contracts were firm (no later 
price renegotiation) while only 6% were redeterminable (price subject 
to later change), However, in dollar terms, redeterminable fixed 
price contracts were only about 10% smaller in total than firm fixed 
price contracts. Thus renegotiable fixed price contracts (in dollar 
terms) were roughly as common as firm fixed price contracts, as of 
1960, They far exceeded firm fixed price contracts earlier in the 
post World War II period, It also is of interest that in a study of 
actual profit rates under incentive type contracts (including firm 
fixed price and redeterminable fixed price contracts), of 100 
contracts, only two actually showed a loss, both being relatively 
small contracts, with 98 contracts showing a profit, most at a rate 
higher than the negotiated rate of profit then being paid on CPFF 
contracts. Thus Morse's study offers some empirical evidence for the 
importance of renegotiation, even when the contract is of the fixed 
price variety. 
What we will argue is that to the extent that renegotiation is 
intended to offset potential out of pocket losses due to turbulence, 
this induces a factor hiring bias that might well be a prime reason 
for the observed low capital intensity bias of contractors. 
The argument is this, Suppose that because of turbulence, the 
contractor finds that he cannot even cover his variable costs on the 
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order quantity announced by DoD, In such a situation, the contractor 
has a positive incentive to renege on his contract, unless 
nonperformance penalties exceed his contemplated out of pocket losses. 
Presumably this is precisely the time when the contractor is most apt 
to obtain the most favorable terms in contract renegotiation. We next 
explore the implications of a model in which the contractor has 
assurance that in the case of prospective out of pocket losses, DoD 
will provide compensation sufficient so that the contractor's out of 
pocket costs are covered, The results we obtain generalize in an 
obvious way to the case where there is a subjective pdf over the 
fraction of his losses that will be absorbed by DoD. We consider the 
case of a FP contract, but clearly the analysis can be extended to 
cover the case of CPIF or MFP contracts. Given our assumptions, the 
profit function under renegotiation becomes the following: 
pq1 - PK - wL1 + &(pq2 - wL2) for q2 s q 
rc(q1,q2,K) = (8) 
pq1 - PK - wL1 for q2 2 q 
where q satisfies p2q - wL2(q,K) = o.
(Because g is strictly concave in L, it is only on 
sufficiently large orders that out of pocket losses can occur due to 
rising marginal production costs; with a more general production 
function, renegotiation could take place either at sufficiently low or 
at sufficiently high order quantities.) 
In considering renegotiation as an alternative to turbulence 
in explaining low capital intensities of defense contractors, the 
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appropriate question to ask is "how does the capital choice of a firm 
operating in nondefense contracting (with renegotiation not available) 
compare with the choice of the same firm, under the same turbulence 
conditions, in defense contracting?" Proposition 6 provides the 
intuitively appealing answer. 
Proposition 6 Under renegotiation, the level of capital is less than 
that which would be chosen by the same contractor under the same 
conditions without renegotiation. This holds for risk averse or risk 
neutral contractors, and it holds under FP, CPIF, or MFP contracting. 
Proof: Let U(rct ) be the monoton
e concave utility function of the 
contractor for t = 1,2, normalized so that U(O) O, and let f be the 
pdf. Let K
* 
denote the level of capital chosen under renegotiation 
and let K
** 
denote the level of capital chosen when renegotiation is 
not available. Then we have 
* * * 





0 UK(rc2(K ))f(q2)dq2 VK(K ) UK(rc2(K 
)) + 0 
* ** 
would have Suppose K = K Then we 
*
* VK(K ) (-> 0 f: q 
** 
UK(rc2(K ))f(q2
)dq2 s o. 







) = -- > o.dK d K  gL 
O, and 
0 
Since VKK < 0, it follows that K* i K
*
* with strict inequality when 
F(q) ( 1. 
The use of renegotiation as a device to compensate for 
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turbulence induces a capital intensity bias into input hiring because 
DoD in effect offers a kind of insurance against out of pocket losses, 
an insurance that produces a moral hazard response of underinvestment 
in capital on the part of the defense contractor, 
Renegotiation does more than this, however, Whether 
renegotiation is of the crude type indicated in expression (8) or of a 
more sophisticated type involving partial coverage of out of pocket 
losses on a probabilistic basis, in any case renegotiation introduces 
a nonconvexity into the profit function. In turn this means that 
Proposition 5 no longer necessarily holds. If the compensation paid 
by renegotiation to the contractor exceeds the costs of turbulence as 
given in (7), then the contractor would have a preference for more 
turbulence rather than less, and vice versa, To the extent that 
contractors can influence the level of turbulence by their own 
actions, this introduces a new source of inefficiency into the 
procurement process. In any case, of course, DoD costs still rise 
with an increase in turbulence; with a renegotiation scheme that 
overcompensates the contractor, DoD bears more than 100% of the costs 
of turbulence. 
Conclusion 
This study of the effect of turbulence on cost and a capital 
intensity bias on the part of defense contractors verifies that 
turbulence is a source of cost increases for DoD on all contracts 
other than CPFF, where the results are indeterminate, Turbulence 
might also be a factor helping to account for the low capital/output 
ratios of defense contractors, but this can be guaranteed only under 
conditions that are difficult to interpret economically. 
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An alternative suggestion is that the possibility of 
renegotiating defense contracts when out of pocket losses could occur 
offers an explanation for capital intensity bias. It also can result 
in a situation in which positive incentives are created for 
contractors to increase turbulence. 
APPENDIX 
An alternative approach to the issue of the effect of 
turbulence on expected cost (Proposition 1 of the paper) is this: 
Let g(L2,K) be a real valued function with continuous second 
partial derivatives that is monotone increasing and concave in L2, 
Assume the existence of a cost minimizing choice of capital under 
certainty and under uncertainty for any pdf over q2, To simplify 
notation, let x = q2 and Y a(x - µ) + µ where µ = E(x) and 
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0 i a i 1. Then have E(Y) µ and V(Y) = a2a2 where a2 = V(X), Then 
Proof: 
It suffices to show Ey[f(Y,K)] i Ex[f(x,K)], or 
f f[a(x - µ) + µ,K]h(x)dx i f f(x,K)h(x)dx for every K. Since 
Y 
= a(x - µ) + µ = ax + (1 - a)µ, then f(Y,K) i af(x,K) 
+ (1 - a)f(µ,K) by convexity of f in q2. Therefore 
f f(Y,K)h(x)dx i a f f(x,K)h(x)dx + (1 - a)f(µ,K) 
Let Z = f f(x,K)h(x)dx - (a J f(x,K)h(x)dx + (1 - a)f(µ,k)). 
Then Z = (1 - a)(Exf(x,K) - f(µ,k)) 2 0 by Jensen's 
Inequality. Hence we have established the proposition, 
In the case of the CES function, the effect of turbulence on 
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the amount of capital hired is the following: 
(i) If the production function is CES production function and if the 
return to scale parameter y L 1 and the parameter for elasticity 
of substitution a L 2, then an increased uncertainty in 
production requirement will force the firm to invest less in 
capital, 
(ii) If the production function is CES and if the return to scale 
parameter y i 1 and the parameter for elasticity of substitution 
y i 1, then an increased uncertainty will lead to increase in 
capital investment. 
Proof: 
(1) Note that CEC production function is given by: 
q = [&L- p + (1 - &)K-p]-y/p 2 2 
where & is a distribution parameter, 0 < & 1 
y is a return scale parameter, y > 0 
p is a substitution parameter and is given by 
p = �with a the elasticity of substitution, a L O.a 
( 2) Then L2 f(q2,K) = &
1/pq2 - A
-1/p 
where A 1 - (1 - &)K-pq2P
/r, 0 <A < 1 
f211 = B(l + 2p - (p + y)A) 
( l+p-
2y) -( 1 +3 p) 
where B = &l/p&-
2
q 0 A P K- (l+p) (& - 1) < O 2 
( 3 ) For (i) it suffices to show f211 > o. In particular, we want to 
show 1 + 2p - (p + y)A i 0, or i - 1 -(! - 1 + y)A i O. Since a a 
a 2 2 we have � - 1 - (: - 1 + y)A � -(: - 1 + y)A(l - y)A, 
Since y 2 1 and A O, we have (1 - y)A � O, thus f211 > O.
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(4) For (ii) it suffices to show f211 < 0, In particular we want to 
show � - 1 - : - 1 + y)A > 0, Since a � 1 we have 
� - 1 -(l - 1 + y)A > 1 - 1 + (1 - y)A 2 (1 - y)A. Since y � 1 a a a . 
and A > 0, we have (1 - y)A 2 0, thus f211 > 0, 
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